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Regulating for Mutual Gains? Non-Union Employee Representation and the 
I&C Directive  
 
Abstract 
Interest in ‘mutual gains’ has been principally confined to studies of the unionised 
sector. Yet there is no reason why this conceptual dynamic cannot be extended to 
the non-unionised realm, specifically in relation to non-union employee 
representation (NER). Although extant research views NERs as unfertile terrain for 
mutual gains, the paper examines if NERs developed in response to the European 
Directive on Information and Consultation of Employees may offer a potentially more 
fruitful route. The paper examines this possibility by considering three cases of NERs 
established under the I&C Directive in Ireland, assessing the extent to which mutual 
gains were achieved. 
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Regulating for Mutual Gains? Non-Union Employee Representation and the 
Information and Consultation Regulations 
1. Introduction 
Interest in the ‘mutual gains enterprise’ has been a feature of employment relations 
studies since the publication of Kochan and Osterman’s (1994) text on the 
subject.The concept outlines that while management and workers interests may 
diverge, there is ample opportunity, through problem-solving arrangements, to create 
shared benefits for both parties. Interest in mutual gains has since blossomed, 
although the literature has been largely confined to unionised settings. Such 
inclinations are surprising given the decline in unionisation and the growth in multiple 
non-union voice regimes (Lewin, 2010). Furthermore, as Walton and McKersie 
(1965) note, problem-solving activity can be realised through a variety of 
mechanisms. Given that problem-solving is claimed to be an inherent feature of 
mutual gains, then there is no reason why its study cannot be extended to non-union 
relations. As Ackers et al. (2004:16) argue: “It seems unreasonable and 
sociologically unproductive to rule out non-union forms, whether voluntary or state-
regulated…before examining the evidence”. 
 
Parallel to studies in mutual gains has been a progressive interest in the dynamics of 
non-union employee representation (NERs). Initially a focus of American 
employment relations, interest in NERs rapidly took on international dimensions, 
particularly in other liberal-market countries. NERs often find their genesis around 
management seeking to solve workplace issues by establishing a representation 
forum. According to Kaufman and Taras (2000) and Gollan (2010), resolving 
grievances and problems lie at the centre of NER evolution. In the absence of 
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unions, NERs may, theoretically, offer scope for the realisation of some mutual gains 
type outcomes (Johnstone et al. 2010). Yet the analysis has been mixed. Dietz et al. 
(2005) posit potential gains from NERs, whilst Knell (1999) finds marginal differences 
in effect between non-union and union partnership style arrangements. Johnstone et 
al. (2010) suggest that if the benchmarks for measuring the success of NER 
partnerships are more modest, and if weighting is given to process rather than 
outcome, then such arrangements can benefit both employer and employee. Yet 
these are isolated islets of optimism in a more general sea of scepticism: a range of 
authors see NERs as ineffective, managerially dominated creatures (Badigannaver 
and Kelly, 2005; Gollan, 2007; Upchurch et al. 2008).  
 
Significantly, the environment within which evidence about NERs is collated, in the 
UK and Ireland in particular, has institutionally changed in light of the transposition of 
the European Directive 2002/14/EC, more commonly known as the Information and 
Consultation Directive (I&C). These regulations established, for the first time in the 
UK and Ireland, a framework giving employees the right to be informed and 
consulted by their employers, including the potential for NER and other non-union 
mechanisms. It is not inconceivable that some firms will re-consider their voice 
regimes in response to the regulations. In this paper, a sample of NER regimes, 
established in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in light of the I&C 
regulations, are examined to consider whether such arrangements offer favourable 
opportunities for mutual gains realisation. Given the European regulatory context 
noted above, NERs, in some cases, may not be wholly managerially-sponsored to 
the degree that they reflect legislative requirements and, theoretically, provide 
employees with the opportunity of representative voice buttressed by statutory 
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supports. Furthermore, the concept of mutual gains has been undeveloped in the 
NER literature as most research has opted to consider comparisons with union voice 
or the possible impact on high performance working (Kim and Kim, 2004). This 
article therefore addresses the question: ‘Do mutual gains result from NERs created 
in response to the I&C Directive?’ The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 and 3 
review existing literature on mutual gains, NERs and the I&C regulations. The 
research methodology is outlined in Section 4 and the findings from three cases of 
firms, with I&C influenced NER regimes, are presented in Sections 5 and 6. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the findings in Section 7. 
 
2. Mutual gains reviewed 
The notion of mutual gains is anchored on a premise that whilst management and 
workers interests may diverge, there is ample opportunity to create jointly shared 
benefits. Although no exact definition of mutual gains exists, it might be interpreted 
as follows:  
 
 
[1] Management and workers are conscious of the shared consequences of 
their actions and therefore openly exchange information in a cooperative 
fashion so as to highlight areas of joint interest.  
[2] They then generate decision making options, through problem-solving 
structures, and  
[3] Choose those options that offer the highest joint returns for the parties.  
(c.f. Kochan and Osterman, 1994; McKersie et al. 2008) 
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The literature is not entirely prescriptive as to what procedural and/or substantive 
features of employment are assigned to mutual gains territory, though it is generally 
thought to incorporate diverse aspects like pay, employment security, training, job re-
design, participative or involvement structures. Much of the mutual gains literature 
has focused on the concept of firm-level ‘partnership’ (Danford et al. 2004; 
Johnstone et al. 2010). Under the perception that collective bargaining is being 
marginalised in the ‘new economy’, mutual-gains partnerships, based upon shared 
understandings between employers and employees, have been championed by 
advocates to ensure collective dynamics remained relevant to ‘high performance 
workplaces’. It also served as a rebuff to neo-classical economics, wherein the union 
presence was viewed as a source of ‘rigidity’ (Metcalf, 1989). Building on Freeman 
and Medoff (1984), Kochan and Osterman argued that rather than being blockages 
to productivity improvements, worker representatives, in collaboration with 
management, and underpinned with institutional supports, could engage in joint 
problem solving to improve both firm performance and returns for workers. 
Management and workers are still held to maintain their own separate interests, but 
ultimately seek to satisfy such contiguous interests through co-operation (Kochan, 
2008). Shared understandings are said to arise from such coalitions about the 
challenges facing the firm and lead to the interests of employees being actively 
considered in business strategy. What is important in such considerations is ‘how’ 
problem-solving is played-out in practice. Bacon and Blyton (2007:831) show that the 
processrequires a degree of conflictual behaviours for mutual gains outcomes to be 
regarded as genuine for both sides; for example, a trade-off between wage 
increases for workers with productivity savings for management through staffing 
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reductions. In other words, mutual gains require some requisite degree of distributive 
power.  
 
Empirically, there are a variety of results which appear to support all three strands. 
Whilst studies suggest that mutual gains outcomes are viable (Guest et al. 2008), 
others have evidenced more negative conclusions (Kelly, 2004). There is evidence 
that mutual gains approaches trigger employee access to areas of decision-making 
previously the preserve of management (Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009). Yet there is 
also evidence that mutual gains can be confined to operational and trivial matters 
(Teague and Hann, 2010). These latter outcomes can often be underpinned by weak 
management commitment. More broadly, Stuart and Martinez-Lucio (2005) argue 
that for partnership to be effective, it requires support by institutions which deliver 
long-term mutual gains.  
 
3. Mutual gains and non-union employee representation 
The study of mutual gains has been largely developed and examined in the 
unionised sector. But as Lewin (2010) and Johnstone et al. (2010) have argued, 
there seems to be no particular reason to rule out the possibility of mutual gains 
arrangements in the non-union sector. Indeed Stuart and Martinez-Lucio (2005) have 
identified the need for further research of this arrangement. In this context, it is useful 
to turn our attention to alternative means developed within the non-union sector for 
employee representation. Non-union employee representation (NER) is one such 
mechanism. NERs are characterised as involving only employees in the organisation 
as members of the representative body; there is no formal linkage to trade unions; 
the resources are supplied by the organisation in which the body is based; and it 
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involves representation of employee function rather than direct forms of participation 
(Gollan, 2010).  
 
However, scholars for the most part tend to treat managerially-sponsored NERs 
sceptically. As Butler (2005) notes, NERs have deficiencies in both ‘power’ and 
‘autonomy’. By power, it is operationalised to mean ‘manifest power’ in terms of the 
‘scope’ and ‘range’ of issues influenced or controlled by the employee 
representatives. With reference to ‘scope’, this may be conceived as a scale of 
possible involvement extending from information provision at one end to negotiation 
at the other, with consultation claiming an intermediary position. ‘Range’ on the other 
hand suggests breadth of issues falling between ‘tea and toilet roll’ type issue at one 
end, to areas typically the preserve of managerial prerogative at the other; 
investment, job security and work organisation. NERs appear skewed towards 
information provision however, with employee influence being minimal and issues 
confined to the relatively marginal (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005, Upchurch et al. 
2008). Autonomy, taken to mean ‘self-rule’ and freedom from external control (Butler, 
2005: 276), can be defined operationally as the extent to which representative 
structures are independent of managerial diktat and the degree to which terms of 
reference, constitution, agenda and process are determined by employees or their 
representatives. This may address the extent to which representatives are subject to 
“explicit and/or implicit pressures that function as signposts curbing and/or 
sanctioning specific modes of behaviour” (Butler, 2005: 277). Again the literature 
tends to be sceptical of NERs freedom from managerial constraints and 
manipulation. Left to their own devices, employers introduce weak forms of voice 
that have little or no independence from management. Employee representatives in 
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such structures, with no independent organisational supports and often with limited 
access to training and resources, may be easily manipulated. 
 
Prima facie then, there are reasons to be sceptical about the efficacy of NERs to 
deliver mutual gains. Unlike the dynamic in the unionised sector, employees are 
unlikely to have independent, distributary power resources and sanctions to fall back 
upon. Such pre-emptory, background resources may be necessary to impel mutual 
gains type behaviour to work successfully. However, it is important to examine if 
these elements of deficient power and negligible autonomy, that dominate research 
on NERs, can be moderated by recent regulatory developments. Specifically, we 
refer here to the national implementation of the Information and Consultation 
Directive (I&C) in the UK through the Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations 2004 and in Ireland through the Employees (Provision of Information 
and Consultation) Act 20061. Formally, the Directive’s implementation is of 
importance for the voluntarist regimes of the UK and Ireland where statutory voice 
regulation is weakly embedded. These provisions offer what Hall (2005) describes as 
a ‘legislatively-prompted voluntarism’ for worker information and consultation: 
emphasis is placed on workers and management reaching a voluntary agreement, 
with standard legal provisions offering a “fallback” (providing for election of employee 
representatives on collective forums with accompanying rights to information and 
consultation) where there is a failure to agree. The legislation is equally applicable in 
the non-union sector as it is in the unionised. Moreover, these rights are underpinned 
by EU social policy objectives to stimulate a culture of mutual gains through 
“strengthening social dialogue with a view to promoting change compatible with 
                                                          
1 While there are a number of technical differences between the UK and Irish implementations, they are 
beyond the scope of this article.  
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preserving the priority objective of employment” (Directive 2002/14/EC: 29). Prior to 
transposition, some scholars foresaw the regulations as holding far reaching 
consequences for the way British and Irish employers informed and consulted 
employees over a wide range of workplace issues (Sisson, 2002).  
 
Yet the uptake of legally enacted rights to date does not appear transformative of the 
I&C terrain in the UK and Ireland (Dundon et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2011). However, 
some firms may have been influenced by the Directive to, either review 
arrangements as a result of the regulations, or, initiate new arrangements (Wilkinson 
and Gollan, 2007; Koukiadaki, 2010). This adds a nuance to appreciating NER 
potential for mutual gains as such arrangements are now supported by legislation 
and are, in theory, provided with some formal institutional distance from 
management. Thus, in keeping with the above theoretical benchmarks, an element 
of increased power and autonomy is afforded to those NERs legislatively backed by 
the transposed Directive. In firms with 50 or more employees, I&C forums are 
formally no longer wholly managerially sponsored, but theoretically, have recourse to 
independent statutory backing where workers seek to pursue it. In terms of ‘power’, 
the UK and Irish legal instruments theoretically enable greater ‘scope’ and ‘range’ 
over issues influenced. Employees are provided with the right to information and 
consultation about issues impacting on employment, work organisation or 
contractual relationships. Thus the scope is fixed at the intermediate level of 
consultation with the range of issues impacting on more high-level substantive and 
procedural aspects of employment.  
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The regulatory frameworks specify that information must be given in such ways as to 
enable representatives to conduct an adequate study and prepare for consultation. 
Where in place, employers are obliged to give employee representatives an 
opportunity to meet with them and give their opinion on matters subject to 
consultation. But the regulations in the UK and Ireland have been viewed as a 
minimalist transpositional interpretation of the EU Directive and the constraints 
compelling employers to implement collective employee representative rights are 
quite a blunt instrument: it is highly significant that such rights are not automatic and 
must be triggered by employees. Employers may utilise direct arrangements (in 
Ireland) and ‘pre-existing agreements’, which can further dilute the regulations’ 
potential; although the regulations state that these must be approved by employees, 
set out information and consultation provisions and be capable of independent 
verification. Thus as Wilkinson and Gollan (2007: 1138) argue, “the I&C regulations 
could easily result in ‘weak’ employer-dominated partnerships and non-union firms 
using direct communications and information while marginalizing collective 
consultation”. Referring back to power, what appears crucial here are latent ‘power 
bases’ or ‘resource possession’ as allied to a subjective element or a “willingness to 
act” (Butler, 2005: 276). Poole (1975: 17) defines latent power as reflecting the 
power bases or resources at the disposal of particular parties; this is seen as an 
underlying power of particular groups and their potential for achieving given ends. 
The extent to which employees can exercise power over the scope and range of I&C 
issues in NERs depends on their awareness of, and willingness to, take the 
opportunities afforded in the regulations: for example to secure negotiated 
agreements, trigger the ‘standard rules’ or to draw on supports of overseeing state 
inspectorates or the civil courts to ensure compliance (or issue penalties). Employee 
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capacity to enact such potentialities might be speculated to be weak of course: one 
survey of a sample of British employees found that only 13 per cent were aware of 
the regulations (CHA, 2005 cited in Wilkinson and Gollan, 2007). 
 
With reference to the other measurement benchmark of ‘autonomy’, the regulations 
offer opportunities that assist independence from managerial manipulation. Whether 
direct involvement, pre-existing or negotiated agreements or standard rules apply [1], 
the arrangements must be approved by either employees and/or their 
representatives and be capable of independent verification. Where rights are 
triggered by employees, employers are obliged to either engage in a ‘negotiated 
agreement’ or the ‘standard rules’ with independently elected or nominated 
employee representatives. Thus the terms of reference, constitution and overall 
representative framework are theoretically independent of managerial control or 
manipulation. Some measure of autonomy has been embedded into the legislation, 
albeit minimalist,  for employee representatives to act independently of management 
through rights to paid-time off to prepare and attend meetings; rights to facilities for 
information and consultation duties and rights to paid time off for training courses 
relevant to I&C duties; as well as protection from unfair dismissal. All employees 
must be entitled to take part in the appointment or election of representation and this 
process must be arranged in such a way that all employees are represented. 
However it is worth noting that there may well be gradations of autonomy in this 
regard: it is not implausible that structures ‘triggered’ by employees might offer 
greater room for autonomy than managerially crafted pre-existing agreements (even 
though the latter mechanism still requires adherence to regulatory stipulation and 
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employee consent). This implies a certain element of context dependency in 
unpacking the efficacy of the regulations. 
 
Whilst the opportunities of greater power and autonomy are therefore present under 
the regulations, our analysis hitherto suggests a reliance on employees to ensure 
such statutory supports are mobilised. Yet it is not inconceivable that where 
employers adhere to a sophisticated non-union style, there may be a greater 
willingness on their part to utilise the legislative supports to ensure meaningful NER 
arrangements. Given the potentialities of greater power and autonomy offered by the 
regulations, the question becomes to what extent it is conducive to fostering mutual 
gains. Initial research on I&C regulations would suggest mixed outcomes: for 
example, Taylor et al. (2009) dismiss its capacity for example to influence 
redundancy outcomes in the context of six UK unionised case studies. Alternatively, 
the assessment by Hall et al. (2011), based on a more empirically encompassing 
sample and set of issues, is more tempered, suggesting that while the legal 
framework remains at the periphery, outcomes can be vary by degrees of 
management commitment. Koukiadaki (2010) similarly uncovers mixed results in this 
regard; with some success in an online, non-union commercial bank but largely 
symbolic forms in a business and management consultancy. Notably, she argues 
that “much work remains to be done on the ways in which such information and 
consultation arrangements can evolve as effective mechanisms for the exercise of 
the ‘voice’ rights that the Directive confers” (Koukiadaki, 2010: 366). Hence, this 
paper focuses on employee voice in non-union enterprises and addresses the 
question, ‘Do mutual gains result from NERs created in response to the I&C 
Directive?’  
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4. Research Methodology 
The data presented in this article is derived from a larger project investigating the 
impact of the I&C regulations in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In this 
project, a multiple case study design was adopted to obtain evidence from different 
economic sectors of activity, for between and within sector comparisons and across 
the different jurisdictions. Given this paper’s select concerns, the cases presented 
here represent a smaller sub-set of firms and is offered for purely illustrative 
purposes. Three cases aligned with the theoretical interest in NERs shaped by the 
regulations. Data collection in the three cases was predominately qualitative-based 
involving interviews with key management and employee respondents. Interviewees 
involved a minimum of senior HRM, senior manager, line manager, employee 
representative and six employees. Secondary methods consisted of internal and 
external documentary material. The research involved multiple visits to the company 
sites over a two year period. 
  
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
The first case is BritCo, a former UK state-owned enterprise in the services field and 
now the second largest firm in its sector in Ireland [1]. In 2005, BritCo in the Republic 
merged with the pre-existing Northern Ireland group, forming BritCo Ireland. At the 
time of research, it employed 3000 staff in Ireland (2000 in the Republic and 1000 
Northern Ireland). While the business operates on an all-island basis, the company’s 
human resource approach is different across the two jurisdictions: in Northern 
15 
 
Ireland, there is a history of unionised arrangements; in the Republic, which is non-
union, a voice regime was created in response to the Regulations (the latter the 
focus for this paper).  Interviewees were comprised of six managers, one union 
organiser, four non-union representatives, and thirteen employees from various 
operational levels of the company. 
 
The second case is ManufactureCo: a family-owned company based in Northern 
Ireland. It manufactures window blinds for the domestic market. The company 
underwent considerable expansion during the early years of the millennium, 
expanding from approximately 50 to 200 employees in five years and, at the time of 
the research, employed 300 employees at its single-site facility. A non-union 
company, the firm set up the ‘Employee Forum’ in 2006 under the influence of the 
I&C Directive. The data for the case is based on qualitative data derived from the 
Chief Executive, two members of the HRM team, four employee representatives and 
10 employees. 
 
The third case is RetailCo: a British retail company with 19 stores across Ireland with 
1,500 employees at the time of research. The company is non-union with a 
paternalistic management philosophy. Voice mechanisms involved an integrated 
NER at all corporate levels. Whilst the NER pre-dates the regulations, RetailCo 
redesigned elements of the NER to adhere with legislative requirements. Interviews 
were conducted with HRM Director for the Republic, the HR Director for Northern 
Ireland, 10 managerial grades at store level, six employee representatives and six 
employees.  
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The data from the three cases is presented thematically. The findings consider first 
the regulations’ influence on the establishment, or redesign, of the NERs. The 
process and outcomes of NER are then considered; particularly whether the formal 
properties of power and autonomy offered by the regulatory influenced arrangements 
were enabling of mutual gains.   
 
5. The I&C Directive, NER Creation and Structure 
BritCo, on entering the Republic of Ireland market in 2000, acquired a non-union firm 
employing close to 2,000 employees. This latter company had been an 
entrepreneurial-owned, non-union firm. In turn however, this meant a vacuum in 
relation to collective employee voice. With the imminent transposition of the Directive 
in the Republic in 2005, management sought to fill this vacuum with an ‘Information 
and Consultation Forum’ that would meet the Directive’s requirements. This was 
designed to be a ‘pre-existing agreement’ but framed against the standard provisions 
of the Directive. This agreement appears to have been ‘approved by employees’ in a 
manner consistent with Section 9(3a) of the relevant Irish Act. That is, the 
arrangement was held to be approved by employees “where the result of employing 
any other procedure agreed to by the parties for determining whether the agreement 
has been so approved discloses that it has been so approved”. In practice, this 
seems to have amounted to little else in BritCo than senior managers handpicking 
‘representatives’ to sign off on the arrangement. In interviews in 2009, senior 
management noted that the forum was essentially a ‘tick the box exercise’ in order to 
be seen to comply with the regulatory requirements. Whilst formal provisions for 
elected employee representatives were provided for, their actual selection 
wasinformal and haphazard in practice, with some employees simply asked by their 
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line manager to attend forum meetings. Meetings of the forum were similarly 
disorganised and irregular, with no set agenda. In most cases, they were simply a 
report by senior management on the financial situation with discussion kept to a 
minimum. In any case, the forum was largely defunct by the middle of 2006 as no 
meetings were held subsequently. Indeed employees interviewed in 2009 had not 
even heard of the ‘Information and Consultation Forum’. 
 
From early 2007, unrest amongst employees in BritCo in the Republic was evident 
regarding aspects of a then ongoing corporate restructuring. A number of 
organisational departments were closed down and moved to Northern Ireland with a 
number of employees expected to relocate. There were also fears around potential 
redundancies as a consequence of the restructuring, an issue further aggravated by 
employee concerns over the apparently low terms and conditions on offer as evident 
in the staff handbook. Added to this were grievances over salary structure and 
scales, namely a lack of transparency over employees’ salary grading. This led to a 
union organising campaign in early to mid-2007. Support for the union appears to 
have been strong with claims by the union that 30% of BritCo employees became 
members between 2006 and 2008. Management interpreted union support as 
requiring changes in voice relations resulting in the inoperative ‘Information and 
Consultation Forum’ being, as one union organiser wryly put it, “taken down from a 
dusty shelf” and re-calibrated by management. The forum was re-branded BritCo 
Vocal in the summer of 2007 and was utilised far more vigorously, meeting every 
four weeks instead of at the end of every three months. According to the HRM 
Director of BritCo: 
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The information and consultation forum was in place before we received 
advances from the union, but when we rebranded to Vocal there was certainly 
a little bit more noise in the system. So we enhanced the relationship, 
because if we got that right, we felt employees wouldn’t see the need for a 
third-party.  
 
In ManufactureCo, the NER was initially prompted by other influences, chiefly 
stemming from management seeking accreditation from Investors In People (IiP). 
For most of its history, the company was a family managed entity with a paternalistic 
informality characterising employment relations. Despite having grown in 
organisational capacity and numbers employed, as well as professionalising internal 
management structures in the latter half of the last decade, ManufactureCo had no 
system of formal voice apart from individual grievance and disciplinary procedures. 
The IiP Group advised that implementing a formal information and consultation 
structure would assist in the accreditation process and suggested that the Northern 
Ireland Labour Relations Agency (LRA) might assist management in best-practice on 
the matter. An LRA advisor was brought into ManufactureCo to assist the company 
in designing its NER and he based the constitution and structure on the standard 
provisions of the Regulations. Employee approval for the Forum was secured 
through a company-wide ballot, with a 60 per cent participation rate amongst 
employees and full endorsement of the NER arrangement. 
 
Whilst the forum was set up in 2005, by the time of research in 2009 and 2010, the 
HRM Team noted that, in its first years, the NER had played a negligible role in 
company affairs. The HRM manager commented that by the time of his appointment 
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in 2007, the forum was limited to health and safety considerations. Similar to BritCo, 
the NER was reinvigorated as a result of what the Chief Executive described as an 
“aggressive” union recognition campaign at the plant. Unlike BritCo however, support 
for the union was at a low level: despite lodging an application for statutory union 
recognition under the UK union recognition provisions, the union did not satisfy the 
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) that 10 per cent of workers in the company 
were union members or that that a majority of workers at the plant favoured 
recognition. Despite this, management were conscious that an underlying reservoir 
of grievances may have existed and this encouraged the promotion of the NER. Of 
note, is that despite the apparently low level of support for the union at the plant, the 
researchers had to enter into agreement with management that no issues pertaining 
to trade unionism would be raised in the data collection instruments and that 
questions of trade union representation would not be broached with any employees. 
Yet none of the employee representatives or employees interviewed raised issues 
around trade unionism of their own accord, while the HRM team were of the opinion 
that there was no union activity in the plant at the time of the research. 
 
The final case, RetailCo, had a long history of internal voice arrangements, a policy 
shaped by the company’s non-union paternalism. Traditionally a store level 
consultative committee was used in company sites, with the possibility of pursuing 
issues to a divisional office level. This was largely an ad-hoc affair and could often 
be dependent upon local-level managers’ commitment. In the late 1990s, this 
practice was restructured, with a new multi-tiered NER introduced to give more 
scope and depth to consultative arrangements. This structure was known internally 
as Bottom-Up. It operated through a sequence of meetings at store, regional, 
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divisional and national level, organised in a uniform manner throughout the 
company. Meetings were structured to take place at each level on a quarterly basis, 
starting at store level, followed by meetings at progressively higher levels so that, 
where deemed necessary, problems could be progressed from store to national 
level. Following a review of the system in 2001, Bottom-Up was re-fashioned to pre-
empt the introduction of the I&C regulations. This provided a formal nomination and 
election procedure, by secret ballot, for store level employee representatives as well 
as consultative roles in respect of work organisation, employment and contractual 
relationships. Prior to this, there had been no consistent approach with employee 
representative selection: either enthusiastic volunteers or ad-hoc selection by line 
management. In addition, formal allowances for training were introduced for 
representatives as well as an agreed allocation of time to carry out duties. According 
to management the change was claimed to be driven by a desire to deepen 
employee participation generally as much as a desire to meet the regulations. Yet 
there was also evidence that the forum served the needs of union avoidance: 
 
With the Forum, it was never explicit, but the company is not a unionised 
company…The Forum is a way of saying that we operate the type of culture 
that we would never want people to think they’d need a union. That they had 
enough avenues for grievance procedures or Forum procedures to be able to 
deal with any situations in the store. 
HRM Director, Republic of Ireland 
 
 
6. NERs, Power, Autonomy, Problem-Solving and Mutual Gains 
Mutual gains rotates on an assumption that, in the process of problem-solving, both 
sides exchange information to advance interests that are deemed beneficial to both 
parties, with the subsequent generation of options and final, the choosing of those 
that offer the highest joint returns. The extent to which these dynamics were 
evidenced in the I&C influenced NERs is now considered. 
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At BritCo there is partial evidence of mutual gains in the reconfigured NER; albeit a 
constrained form of mutuality that distributed limited independent power and 
autonomy to employee representatives vis-à-vis management. One of the first 
matters raised by employee representatives was the widespread concern over 
potential redundancy payment on offer, a fear, noted above, to be exacerbated by 
the context of corporate restructuring. This was a core issue behind the union 
organising campaign. Redundancy terms relied on statutory entitlements alone, 
considerably lower than redundancy terms available to BritCo employees in Northern 
Ireland.  Through the NER, management explained that the terms presented in the 
company handbook had simply been replicated from the original Irish company prior 
to the takeover. Terms were low in the original handbook, management advanced, 
because as a young company, staff would not have held long service. Management 
conceded that review and formalisation of redundancy terms would be undertaken to 
ensure they matched industry standard. It was suggested by employee 
representatives that efforts be made to re-write the handbook in consultation with 
employees. Employee representatives also sought, and gained, a month to review 
the final handbook, and the terms contained therein, through holding meetings with 
their constituencies on any pertinent concerns. A series of NER meetings were then 
dedicated to discussing issues aired by representatives’ constituents. An outcome 
from this process was that aspects of the Northern Irish redundancy arrangements 
were introduced into the Republic: the practice of a redundancy pool wherein 
employees at risk of losing their jobs were given eight weeks to secure a new 
position or project inside BritCo Ireland. In sum, an area of concern to both parties, 
albeit for different reasons, was addressed through openly exchanging information, 
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allowing feedback and influence from employee representatives’ constituents 
through the assigned structures. This constituted an issue of mutual gains problem 
solving for management insofar as it enabled them to dissipate a contentious issue 
behind the union organising and resolve an issue of employee dissatisfaction. For 
employees’, articulating concerns over redundancy and being afforded a consultative 
role, enabled changes that improved redundancy terms.  
 
However distributive tensions moderated the extent of mutuality, which still largely 
took place on management’s terms; management refused to extend the ‘no 
compulsory redundancy’ policy used in Northern Ireland. Despite this, employee 
representatives, and employees interviewed, were not overly dissatisfied with the 
resolution process. The power imbalance was further evident when employee 
representatives sought solution to the second core concern underpinning the union 
organising drive: failure to disclose internal salary scales. Through Vocal, 
management expressed their unwillingness to a change of practice on this matter, 
claiming that open disclosure of such information might be passed to competitors. 
Whilst representatives pressed for disclosure of salary pay bands, management in 
response offered to post a confidential sheet to individual employees, outlining their 
particular roll code, job family and benchmarked pay range. The  proposed solution 
appeared to be unsatisfactory to staff who regarded secrecy on the matter to be, as 
one employee representative put it, “very much cloak and dagger” and lacking 
transparency.  
 
Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 2, the scope and range of NER voice tended to 
narrow over time. Evidence suggests that once management redressed underlying 
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problems prompting union organising, the breadth of issues addressed at Vocal 
narrowed. Attempts at raising other substantive issues, such as the conduct of 
performance appraisals by line management, were claimed by representatives to be 
written off the agenda or ‘glossed over’ by management. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
At best, employees maintained a degree of influence over somewhat more trivial 
decisions. For example, on the re-carpeting of office space, employee 
representatives were given access to departmental budgets and empowered to 
come up with re-furbishing solutions. Similar processes have been at work in the 
selection of private health care insurers for employees. In this context of a narrowing 
of the mutual gains arena, three representatives resigned from the forum under the 
perception that it was “toothless” on more substantive issues. It is noteworthy that 
two of these representatives were active union members and had been elected by 
employees to act as NER representatives. It is instructive to note that the union 
message to members, and potential recruits, in leaflets and press statements was 
that Vocal represented little more than “a tried and tested union avoidance formula”. 
The NER was regarded by the union as a separate “communications body” and not 
comparable to the sought after collective bargaining arrangement. 
 
It was notable that ManufactureCo management described their NER as a 
communicative rather than a consultation forum. For the most part, mutual gains 
amounted to management acting on grievances rather than the parties generating 
decision-making solutions through the problem-solving dynamic described above. 
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For example, employee representatives at the forum raised concerns over the bonus 
for efficiency and productivity. The crux of the grievance was the existence of a 
bonus for ‘productivity’, but none for ‘quality’. Further, the bonus system was team-
based, with one outcome being that poor individual performers could drag an overall 
team down, eroding the payout. Management reviewed existing procedures and an 
amalgamated efficiency and quality bonus system was subsequently introduced, 
although no change was made to the team structure. Employees had no input into 
devising the new bonus scheme, apart from raising it as a grievance at the NER. 
Indeed, this same scheme was five months later unilaterally frozen by management 
in light of economic uncertainty. In short, NER at ManufactureCo appeared based on 
preserving managements’ right to manage, with some limited concessions on 
communicative interaction based around grievance resolution. It did not appear to be 
the representative joint problem-solving dialogue geared towards mutuality, as 
aspired to in the I&C Directive.  
 
That the NER was a lubricant for communicating is evident from how information 
around the suspended bonus was diffused in the plant. The freezing of the bonus 
occurred whilst the organisation was simultaneously increasing production and 
hiring, despite managerial claims of economic uncertainty. This apparent disjuncture 
was noticed on the shop-floor and articulated through representatives at the NER. At 
an NER meeting, a management presentation to representatives claimed that whilst 
the company was increasing production, it was equally experiencing increased costs, 
unfavourable exchange rate fluctuations and being squeezed for discounts by cash-
strapped customers. Explaining the financial context through the NER was seen by 
senior management to displace inaccurate employee perceptions. Nonetheless, 
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information collected from workers would suggest continued cynicism about the 
veracity of management’s claims. Given that the NER dynamics were 
communicative, there appeared little scope for genuine mutual gains processes 
based around enduring consultative dialogue. Yet the CEO and HRM team 
complained that employees saw the forum as a ‘dumping ground’ for shop-floor 
grievances and articulated a desire that employees would contribute ideas to “add 
value” to the business, like increasing output or improving product quality. Indeed 
there is some support for managements’ assessment from interviews with 
representatives, who articulate their role as mediums for airing constituent 
grievances which management could subsequently act upon.  
 
A further barrier to embedding mutual gains were competitive pressures that 
impacted on the shopfloor. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 recession, the 
industry in which the company operated suffered a 30 percent downturn, resulting in 
management seeking new ways of generating revenue streams. Such pressures 
resulted in the release of company products onto a market where the average price 
generated was lower with the result that less money was generated, whilst 
underlying costs remained the same. To lessen these pressures, standard 
production times were reviewed to get underlying costs down and efficiency rates 
increased. Changes occurred in internal quality standards with the introduction of 
barcode systems enabling full quality oversight and control throughout the 
manufacturing process. Such initiatives had ramifications for those at the point of 
production. As shop-floor employees put it: 
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I always feel under pressure to get the work out as management want quality 
and quantity which is impossible as the targets are so high. 
Production Employee 
 
Horrible pressure, loads of stress, targets and targets only. It feels that 
management couldn’t care less about their workforce or their views or 
opinions of the company just as long as their targets are being met. 
Production Employee 
 
The pressure to meet production and quality targets impacted on the NER, even 
from the point of being a grievance-raising vehicle. Employee representatives 
reported difficulties in securing ‘points’ from their constituents. Two representatives 
reported pressures from supervisors, themselves under pressure to ensure their 
work group met targets, to resume duties on return from the Forum. This limited 
opportunities to feedback to constituents. Individual representatives also personally 
opted to return to work perceiving that they had too much work to complete to ensure 
they hit their daily targets. Shop-floor employees commented on their dislike of being 
called to collective meetings with representatives, perceiving them as a distraction 
from their work. Despite the formal allocation of time for representatives to undertake 
their duties, this was not available in practice or utilised. Representatives reported 
‘rushing around’ before meetings to gather points from employees, often leaving their 
workstations as near to the meeting time as possible to ensure workloads were not 
sacrificed. In any case, opportunities to develop the NER as a vehicle for mutual 
gains were inauspicious: there appeared to be a widely held view amongst 
employees that the Employee Forum was little else than a vehicle for downward 
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communication and, crucially, ineffective for problem resolution. Employees claimed 
that whenever a representative was pushed for progress on a particular issue, like 
the frozen bonus, their response was repeatedly that the issue was under review and 
would be addressed in the near future. Such indeterminacy appears to have led to 
widespread employee cynicism and disengagement. By the conclusion of fieldwork, 
the NER, and the representatives, appeared to be displaced by what employees 
perceived to be a more effective problem-solving contact at the point of production: 
the immediate supervisor. Supervisors were perceived to be speedier, and 
potentially more effective, agents in resolving individual employee concerns.  
 
At RetailCo, despite a structurally elaborate system of voice, there was limited 
evidence of effective mutual gains problem-solving. Where discerned it often 
appeared contingent on idiosyncratic management style or site-specific factors. 
Whilst it was difficult to find evidence of joint problem-solving at work in the Republic 
store, in the Northern Ireland site, occasional examples of collaborative actions were 
found. At store level, for a given year, sites are expected to secure at least 95 per 
cent profitability. If this is not reached, managers and employees do not receive their 
annual bonus. At the Northern Irish store, employees had raised a concern at the 
NER that more staff required training on electric pallet trucks as work groups were 
reliant on a handful of individuals for accessing stock in the store room. Store level 
HRM proceeded to review the percentage of staff trained at the site compared to 
other comparable outlets and found that the numbers trained compared favourably. 
This finding was then reported to employee representatives at a subsequent NER 
meeting along with the cost of additional training. The decision was left to the 
employee representatives as to whether they wished to pursue training, deducting 
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the money from the store profit and loss account, which was made available to staff. 
After consultation with employee constituents, the request to pursue further training 
was dropped as employees feared that training costs would undermine store 
profitability targets and annual bonuses. 
 
Aside from this and a small number of similar incidences, it was difficult to discern 
other examples of such behaviour. Similar to ManufactureCo, there was ambiguity 
about how management viewed the NER and the potential for mutual gain. Whilst 
there were senior management claims that the NER scheme aspired to information 
and consultation, this could also co-exist with a view that such bodies were primarily 
“information download”. If gains were obtained, these mostly gravitated to 
management:  
 
Does Bottom-Up improve the business? I don’t think in its current format it 
truly does. If you look at improving the business as not having problems, then 
it does in some way do that by having it there. It prevents something else from 
being created that could hinder the business. But of its very nature, it is quite 
downloady, business-led and almost management having the responses in 
advance of what the questions are.  
HRM Director, Republic of Ireland  
 
In this regard, the NER (similar to ManufactureCo) reflects what Geary and Trif 
(2011) identify as ‘constrained mutuality’. That is, the NER was largely viewed as 
being a form of problem-displacement rather than joint problem-solving and geared 
to isolating employee grievances within a managerially controlled format:  
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There is an avenue there...a place for venting....if it wasn’t there where would 
it go? Would it go to a Rights Commissioner [state arbitration]? Would it invite 
unions in because you didn’t have a voice? So it’s effective at that level that if 
you have got an issue: “have you spoken to your Bottom-Up Rep about it?” 
“Have a chat with them, stick it in the pot, let’s manage it that way”. It’s easy 
to do that kind of stuff. 
Store Manager, Republic of Ireland 
 
That mutual gains characteristics were largely absent was further evidenced by store 
level manager complaints that employees simply used the forum ‘negatively’ to 
advance grievances on issues like vending machines, broken toilet seats and store 
level heating. According to one store level manager, Bottom-Up: 
 
Should be a more positive forum and that’s a challenge...it tends to bring the 
ideas from people that are not happy with things...It has got twisted in that it’s 
all about negativity.  
HR Director, Republic of Ireland 
 
Again, similar to ManufactureCo, senior management did evince an aspiration that 
the forum might be a space whereby employees could contribute ideas on sales or 
customer service; for example, by taking ‘ownership’ of such issues like 
communicating back to staff various company rules on new uniforms or holiday 
entitlements. Similar to Manufacture Co., employees and NER reps regarded the 
forum however as a space for airing grievances. Yet even on this understanding, 
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employees, and the majority of representatives interviewed, were sceptical of the 
NER’s utility for resolving grievances. At a store studied in the Republic, employees 
continuously raised grievances regarding temperature levels inside the facility during 
the summer months. Employees complained to store management, raised the 
issue at Store Bottom-Up, then again the Regional Bottom-Up, up to Divisional level. 
Despite these repeated attempts, no resolution of the issue was undertaken by 
management. Consequently, one of the employees in the store reported the matter 
to the Health & Safety Authority (HSA). The HSA investigated the complaint and 
found it to be valid, serving the company with an enforcement notice, which was 
subsequently complied with. A similar issue existed in a site studied in Northern 
Ireland, where employees continually complained about the cold on a shop-floor 
during the winter. Again in this case, employees reported that despite repeated 
airings at the store NER from 2008, management had not, by 2010, yet acted on the 
grievance. As one employee observed: 
 
You have an opportunity to voice an opinion, but whether any heed will be 
taken of that is another thing altogether. 
Employee Representative, Northern Ireland 
 
Again similar to ManufactureCo, the NER appeared to be displaced in any case by 
employees opting to raise grievances with their immediate line manager. Again, line 
management, and not the NER, were seen as offering a more effective and timely 
means for resolving grievances.  
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Together, the three cases illustrate that the elements of power and autonomy offered 
to employee representatives in theory in the I&C regulations were not enabling of 
collaborative mutual gains joint problem-solving in practice. As such, the regulations 
had little impact in our cases in remedying the shortcomings of NER identified 
elsewhere.     
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper reported on three cases where NERs had been devised under the 
influence of the I&C regulations. The evidence found that the regulations merely 
prompted a reactive response (BritCo. and RetailCo.) or was a very minor reason 
behind tailoring the NER scheme (ManufactureCo.). Even in those cases where 
explicit initiatives were found, responses were of a ‘tick-box’ exercise. Aside from 
one or two instances, in all three cases there was little evidence of embedded or 
extended mutuality. In light of literature concerns, the issue is why the remoulding of 
structures away from a purely voluntarist format to a quasi-legal one, constructed 
under the shadow of the law, remained ineffective in delivering mutuality? With 
reference to the aforementioned constructs of power and autonomy, these crucial 
benchmarks remained unaffected because of the ample scope for employers to 
manoeuvre around the regulations. In a voluntarist context, even where initial 
impulses were propelled by legislative requirement, management were able to 
capture ensuing voice processes. This capacity is undoubtedly enhanced in non-
union environments where the balance of advantage is already tilted in 
managements’ favour (Gollan, 2007). 
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With reference to power, the scope and range of issues remained predominately 
under the control of management. In BritCo, the opportunities for mutual gains were 
perhaps most evident in the initial stages of the revamped NER, when issues of 
some import were considered, like redundancy. However, it is difficult to ascribe this 
as being assisted by the I&C regulations in any meaningful sense. Whilst conducted 
through a structure that could trace its legacy to the regulation’s influence, the 
dynamics of this case were defined more by the proximity of the union recognition 
campaign than any legislative promptings for ‘an exchange of views or establishment 
of dialogue’. The latent power relied upon by workers could perhaps be best 
conceptualised as relying upon union, rather than legislative, power bases. As this 
latent power base seemed to lose momentum and dwindle, the range of issues were 
replaced by relatively secondary matters of an incidental and operational nature: a 
very weak form of mutual gains attainment. Management at BritCo demonstrated a 
partial commitment to mutual gains problem-solving in terms of the scope of issues, 
but this was only insofar as it did not intrude or dilute the management prerogative. 
In ManufactureCo and RetailCo the failings of these NER regimes rested on 
management being inclined to information but not consultation. At ManufactureCo, 
management sent mixed messages on the scope and range of the forum: whilst 
using the NER for downward communication, management also claimed to secure 
employee input into the ‘strategic’ direction of the company. In reality, this translated 
into a desire for workers to contribute improvements at the operational level, which in 
any case was undermined by an environment punctuated by a pervasive, and 
resented, target-setting. These difficulties relate to the conceptualisation of 
autonomy. Whatever autonomy is promised in the formal properties of I&C 
influenced forums, in practice, managerially initiated forums of this kind may suffer 
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from a lack of institutional distance and thus undermine the realisation of genuine 
autonomy.  
 
The limited nature of the NERs in both ManufactureCo and RetailCo to deliver 
substantial gains for employees notably led to its displacement by alternative 
avenues like line management, a feature not hitherto examined in the NER literature. 
Of course the limitations of the findings must be acknowledged here as a potential 
source of bias: two of the three cases had elements, to varying degrees, of union-
avoidance inclinations in informing the NERs. In BritCo and ManufactureCo the 
forums were revitalised when union voice became a spectre on the horizon. Even in 
RetailCo, where the NER, with all its limitations, had been institutionally sustained 
over a considerable period of time, a potential union threat remained something of 
an underlying motivator. It must be stressed then that this particular case of unitary 
anti-unionism was hardly propitious for the emergence of non-union partnership: the 
potential for mutual gains might have been different in a more receptive managerial 
climate of sophisticated human relations (Kessler and Purcell, 2003). 
 
However, explanations for the absence of mutual gains, certainly at ManufactureCo. 
and RetailCo, are not wholly attributable to the actions of management, but are also 
partly connected to the nature of employee agency. In both cases, employees saw 
the NER as problem-solving only in so far as grievances would be raised and then 
passively left to management to resolve. When this proved ineffective, line 
management were turned to. As such it is questionable whether employees sought 
to be self-governing autonomous actors with influence over the representative 
structure, process or agenda or whether they opt for a more ‘servicing’ arrangement. 
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The capabilities needed by worker representatives to engage in meaningful problem-
solving, such as a readiness to actively participate in the democratic engagement 
implied by a mutual gains process, were not evident. As is well established in the 
literatures on industrial democracy, education and training of workers and elected 
representatives is crucial to secure the effective operationalisation of participation 
arrangements (Varman and Chakrabarti, 2004). This is not altogether surprising 
given the non-union context of both companies and the fact that workers and their 
representatives had no knowledge or experience of the legislative requirements of 
the I&C Regulations. Even where there was robust union involvement in the 
background, as in BritCo, the union was disinterested in utilising the potentials 
afforded by I&C sponsored NERs. Employees were not conscious, and in some 
instances did not seek or know how to seek, the latent power resources inherent in 
the regulations. Thus this power base of independent, statutory support went 
unutilised in the absence of knowledge and a ‘willingness to act’ (Butler, 2005: 276). 
Ultimately mutual gains may be more enduring in a unionised sector where in the 
event that management fail to live up to their side of the bargain, employees can 
autonomously mobilise latent power resources of union organisation to become a 
more awkward partner and thus coax management back to the problem-solving table 
(Martin, 1992). Whilst non-unionised workers can and do challenge employers, they 
do have fewer avenues of persuasion when management shows itself to be a less 
than willing participant.  
 
In light of the cases here, there are some policy implications relating to the limited 
functionality of NERs for delivering mutual gains outcomes in voluntarist contexts. 
For an NER to be imbued with greater mutual gains capabilities, revision of the UK 
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and Irish regulations transposing the I&C Directive is one measure that would need 
to be considered. The minimalist transposition of the Regulations in these two 
jurisdictions means current procedures are deficient in enabling employees in non-
union enterprises to exercise sufficient power and autonomy over I&C dynamics. 
Employers also have substantial freedom to customise shallow communicative 
operational forms of NER voice in preference to more robust consultative 
arrangements that integrate employee representatives into problem-solving 
dynamics for mutual gains purposes. Of course one caveat here is that this study 
focuses on instances where pre-existing agreements have been adopted. Structures 
self-consciously ‘triggered’ by employees for example, might be imbued with greater 
degrees of power and autonomy than those cases where pre-existing agreements 
are exclusively managerially-crafted. This suggests that future research on the 
regulations look at those instances where employees have initiated the regulations. 
In any case, the capacity of management to craft an arrangement is assisted by the 
current design of the regulations in both jurisdictions. Accordingly, such flexibility 
offers those employers, who might wish to do so, the opportunity to construct I&C 
bodies that fall far short of the mutual gains espoused in the original Directive.  
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Footnote 
[1] The ICE ‘standard rules’ specify that information and consultation must be provided on information 
pertaining to the economic situation of the organisation; information and consultation on the structure 
and probable development of employment (including any threats to employment); information and 
consultation, with a view to reaching agreement, on decisions likely to lead to changes in work 
organisation or contractual relations. ICE regulations also allow employers to establish a ‘pre-existing 
agreement’ i.e. alternative voluntary I&C arrangements that may differ from the standard rules and 
established prior to an employee request.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Case studies’ details 
Company 
 
Sector of 
activity 
Organizational 
Context 
I&C 
Structures 
History of 
Unionisation 
42 
 
Brit Co. 
 
Services  Evolved from 
acquisition of 
company in the 
Republic in 
2000 and 
subsequent 
merger with 
Northern 
Ireland into one 
all-island entity 
in 2003. 
Employs 2000 
in Republic 
where study 
set in variety of 
engineering, 
support staff 
and sales 
roles. 
I&C Forum set 
up in 2005 as 
a pre-existing 
agreement in 
response to 
I&C 
Regulations 
Non-union in 
Republic of 
Ireland, 
although union 
recognition 
campaign 
initiated in 
2007 which 
claimed to 
have 30% of 
workforce 
support; 
resisted by 
management 
Manufacture 
Co 
 
Manufacture of 
window blinds  
Family-owned 
firm based in 
Northern 
Ireland; 
experienced 
rapid growth in 
size during 
2000s. 
Employs 300 
staff 
predominately 
involved in 
various stage 
of manufacture 
Employee 
Forum set up 
in 2005 as a 
pre-existing 
agreement in 
response to 
I&C 
Regulations 
and Investors 
in People (IiP) 
advice 
Non-union 
company; 
union 
recognition 
campaign 
initiated in – 
but failed to 
meet criteria; 
management 
hostile to idea 
of union 
involvement 
Retail Co. 
 
Home 
improvement 
and DIY retail  
British-owned 
multinational; 
19 outlets 
across 
Northern 
Ireland 
Republic; 
employing 
1500 
predominately 
in retail-sales 
roles. 
Internal array 
of informal and 
formal voice 
mechanisms 
used 
historically. 
NER forum 
reconfigured in 
early 2000s to 
provide for 
formal, elected 
representation 
Non-union 
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Sample of key issues arising and 
consulted through Vocal for year 
2007) 
Sample of key issues arising and 
consulted through Vocal for year 
middle of 2008 to middle of 2009) 
• Consultation over revisions on 
Employee Handbook/Redundancy 
policy 
• Management of facilities budget to 
finance new carpets on third and 
fourth floors of Central Office 
• Consultation over the disclosure 
and presentation of company 
salary scales 
• Transposition of national 
government ‘cycle to work’ 
scheme 
• Consultation over employee 
entitlements to a company car and 
roll-out of new policy 
• Consultation over securing new 
company healthcare providers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
